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NOTES
The Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of
1980: Jurisdictional Uniformity in Antitrust Merger
Law
INTRODUCTION

The Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of 1980' amends a
broad range of antitrust law,' including merger jurisdiction provisions of section 7 of the Clayton Act.' The Act extends the reach of
section 7 to "persons" whose activities are either "in commerce" or
"affect commerce", thereby resolving jurisdictional conflict con1. Pub. L. No. 96-349, 94 Stat. 1154 (1980). The Improvements Act implements several
important recommendations recently made to the President by a group commissioned to
study antitrust laws. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ArORNEY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES (January 22,
1979).
2. The statutes affected are: The Antitrust Civil Process Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1311 et seq.
(1976); Sections 4, 4A, 4C(a)(2), 5(a) and 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 15a,
15c(a)(2), 16(a), 18 (1976); 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976) (disclosure of confidential information);
and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1976) (counsel's liability for excessive costs).
3. Clayton Act, Ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1976)). The Improvements Act amends § 7 of the Clayton Act as follows:
(1) by striking out "corporation" each place it appears in the first and second
paragraphs and inserting in lieu thereof "person" in each such place;
(2) by striking out "corporations" in the second paragraph and in the first sentence of the third paragraph and inserting in lieu thereof "persons"; and
(3) by inserting "or in any activity affecting commerce" after "commerce" each
place it appears in the first three paragraphs;
(4) the amendments made by this section shall apply only with respect to acquisitions made after the date of the enactment of this Act.
Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-349, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 1157
(1980).
The Improvements Act does not alter the substantive standards of section 7 of the Clayton Act. H.R. REP. No. 871, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980). Hence, the courts will continue to
examine whether or not the effect of an acquisition "may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
4. Changes in the existing law made by this amendment are shown as follows: existing
law deleted by the amendments is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italic,
existing law in which no change is made is shown in roman. Section 7 as amended provides:
That no [corporation] person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the
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cerning anticompetitive mergers and section 7.5 The Act serves to.
countermand narrow judicial interpretation of merger jurisdiction, 6
to conform the jurisdictional requirements of section 7 of the Clay-

stock or other share capital and no [corporation] person subject to the jurisdiction
of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets
of another [corporation] person engaged also in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
No [corporation] person shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any
part of the stock or other share capital and no [corporation] person subject to the
jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part
of the assets of one or more [corporations] persons engaged in commerce, or in
any activity affecting commerce where in any line of commerce or in any activity
affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition, of
such stocks or assets, or of the use of such stock by the voting or granting of
proxies or otherwise, may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to
create a monopoly.
This section shall not apply to [corporations] persons purchasing such stock
solely for investment and not using the same by voting or otherwise to bring
about, or in attempting to bring about, the substantial lessening of competition.
Nor shall anything contained in this section prevent a corporation engaged in
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce from causing the formation of
subsidiary corporations for the actual carrying on of their immediate lawful business, or the natural and legitimate branches or extensions thereof, or from owning
and holding all or a part of the stock of such subsidiary corporations, when the
effect of such formation is not to substantially lessen competition.
H.R. REP. No. 871, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1980).
5. Under this bill, mergers "affecting commerce" and not merely mergers "in interstate commerce" can be challenged by the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department or private litigants. Currently, only the Federal Trade Commission has
such authority, and there appears to be no reason why the Antitrust Division or
private parties should be handicapped in enforcing the antitrust laws.
The [other] provision of this bill extends the reach of section 7 of the Clayton Act
beyond its current limitation to mergers between corporations to mergers between
noncorporate entities. Again, the Federal Trade Commission has authority to
challenge mergers between persons and this provision is intended to grant the Antitrust Division and private litigants the same authority.
125 CONG. REc. H3044 (daily ed., May 10, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Rodino).
Commentators agree that this jurisdictional distinction is "anomalous." See L. SULUvAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRuST § 233, at 714 (1977); I P. AREEDA & D. TuRNER,
ANrrrsusT LAW § 233a, at 241 (1978). The purpose of the amendments is to remove these
illogical distinctions. H.R. REP. No. 871, 96th Cong., 2d Seass. 1 (1980).
6. Congress, by enacting this legislation, altered the statutory language that the Supreme
Court relied on in formulating its interpretation of the jurisdictional requirements of § 7 of
the Clayton Act. The House Report clearly stated Congress' intent to modify the Clayton
Act's language in conformity with that of other antitrust laws. Congress thus demonstrated
its dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. American Bldg.
Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271 (1975), which narrowly construed section 7 jurisdiction,
see notes 34-53 infra, and accompanying text, and stated that the express purpose of this
legislation was to "overrule" that case. H.R. Rap. No. 871, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980).
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ton Act with other antitrust merger law,7 and to allow proper coordination of investigation and enforcement of antimerger law by the
appropriate administrative agencies. 8
This article will examine the necessity for amending section 7 of
the Clayton Act and note the practical effects of the amendments
on antitrust merger law in general. The article will then analyze
the potential ramifications the amendments will have on judicial
interpretation of Clayton Act antitrust merger jurisdiction.
SCOPE OF THE IMPROVEMENTS ACT

The Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of 1980 (Improvements Act) is a compilation of legislative bills designed to expedite
private and public enforcement of the antitrust laws and give the
Antitrust Division of the Justice Department and private parties
the same jurisdictional authority as that formerly held only by the
Federal Trade Commission to challenge anticompetitive mergers.9
The major provisions of the Improvements Act: (1) authorize the
Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General in charge of
the Antitrust Division to issue civil investigative demands (CID's)

7. Other antitrust merger law includes §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2
(1976), § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976), and § 7A of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18A (1976). See notes 60-87 infra, and accompanying text. The
provisions of the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act are
designed, respectively, to ensure that the national marketplace is free from unreasonable
trade restraints and monopolies, to protect the rights of both large and small companies
doing business in their respective markets, and to regulate fairness of competition nationally. J. VAN CISE, UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST LAWS (1976).
8. H. R. REP. No. 871, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1980). The Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission are statutorily responsible for the enforcement of §§ 2, 3, 7, and
8 of the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 21, 25 (1976). In addition, private parties may also enforce federal antitrust law. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that "any person who shall
be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws
may sue therefore . . . and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the
cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). Reference to the
"antitrust laws" includes §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, §§ 2, 3, 7 and 8 of the Clayton Act
and § 5 of the FTC Act. E. KITNER, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER 151 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter
cited as KrrNsR]. Antitrust actions can also be brought under state law. See generally Note,
State Antimerger Policy: Divesting the Federal Government of Exclusive Regulation, 12
Loy. CHI. L.J. 531 (1981).
In the Conference Report on the Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of 1980, it was
noted that the Senate bill did not include language permitting the Department of Justice
and private parties to challenge anticompetitive mergers involving business entities engaged
in any activity "affecting" interstate commerce. Ultimately the House and Senate agreed to
the House version of the amendment which included the affecting commerce language. H.R.
REP. No. 1234, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1980).
9. H.R. REP. No. 871, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980).
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to obtain discovery materials produced in prior litigation; (2) allow

the Justice Department to employ outside agents to examine
materials produced pursuant to CID's; (3) permit judges to award

prejudgment interest on actual damages in private, government,
and parens patriae antitrust suits; (4) broaden the range of ex-

penses for which an attorney engaging in dilatory tactics may be
personally liable; (5) adopt the doctrine of collateral estoppel in

antitrust actions, except as to findings made by the Federal Trade
Commission; and (6) expand the jurisdictional reach of section 7 of
the Clayton Act to include mergers and acquisitions involving
"persons" engaged in any activity "affecting commerce."'
The final provision, making the seemingly innocuous change of
amending section 7 of the Clayton Act to include "persons" and
conduct "affecting commerce," constitutes a radical expansion of
section 7 subject matter jurisdiction." This shift represents a reaction to judicial interpretation of section 7 as well as congressional

rethinking of the need for uniformity in the antitrust law."' The
rationale of this shift can best be explained by examining the preAct situation and the changes wrought by the amendments.
NECESSITY FOR AMENDING SECTION

7

OF THE CLAYTON

ACT

Persons Subject to Section 7
Prior to the Improvements Act, section 7 of the Clayton Act was
limited to corporate acquisitions.' 8 No action would lie against a
party to an allegedly anticompetitive merger who had not been incorporated.1 4 Although section 7 expressly applied only to direct
10. See VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST REPORT, No. 5, October 1980. Except for the expansion of the jurisdictional reach of section 7 of the Clayton Act, the provisions of the Improvements Act were made in response to proposals made by the National Commission for
the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REvIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCE-

DURES (January 22, 1979).
11. See notes 13-33 infra, and accompanying text.
12. See notes 54-59 infra, and accompanying text.
13. "No corporation. . . shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the
stock or other share capital. . . [or] the whole or any part of the assets of another corporation . . where. . . the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition
or to tend to create a monopoly." 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
14. Hudson Valley Asbestos Corp. v. Tougher Heating & Plumbing Co., 510 F.2d 1140
(2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975); G.A.F. Corp. v. Circle Floor Co., 329 F.
Supp. 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 463 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 901
(1973). See Beatrice Foods Co., 67 F.T.C. 473 (1965).
In G.A.F. Corp. v. Circle Floor Co., a § 7 claim against individuals was dismissed. In dicta,
the court stated that even if a corporation indirectly obtained stock through purchases ef-
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and indirect corporate acquisitions, the courts began to expand
"corporation" to encompass commercial banks 5 and joint ventures."' Under certain circumstances, section 7 also could apply to
17
stockholders making an acquisition on behalf of the corporation.
The limitation of the jurisdictional reach of section 7 to corpora-

tions affected the ability of the Justice Department to prevent
some potentially anticompetitive mergers. 8 Transactions involving
partnerships, associations, or other unincorporated entities escaped
scrutiny, regardless of their size or potential anticompetitive effect.1 9 Noncorporate business entities, however, populate significant areas of the economy, especially the service sector, in which
the use of the partnership form is frequent.2 0 Many of these
noncorporate entities are economically significant. For example,
the "Big Eight" accounting partnerships had revenues in 1977 of
$350 million to $516 million.21 A merger between any two such
firms might have substantial anticompetitive consequences for the

fected by an individual, no claim would lie against the individual. The court granted summary judgment dismissing the suit against the firm which made the purchases. The court
found no specific facts were alleged which would lead to the conclusion that stock purchases
by officers of the firm were made on behalf of the firm. G.A.F. Corp. v. Circle Floor Co., 329
F. Supp. 823, 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 463 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S.
901 (1973).
15. Transamerica Corp. v. Bd. of Governors, 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1953). The Third
Circuit stated that the corporate acquisition "language is so clear and unambiguous as to
leave no room for construction. Its sweep includes all 'corporations engaged in commerce'
without exception." Id. at 165.
16. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 167 (1964); Julius Nasso Concrete Corp. v. Dic Concrete Corp., 467 F. Supp. 1016, 1023 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
17. Hudson Valley Asbestos Corp. v. Tougher Heating & Plumbing Co., 510 F.2d 1140,
1145 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975); G.A.F. Corp. v. Circle Floor Co., 329
F. Supp. 823, 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 463 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S.
901 (1973).
18. Antitrust ProceduralImprovements and JurisdictionalAmendments: Hearings on
H.R. 4049 Before the Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House
Committee on the Judiciary,96th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Hearings
on H.R. 4049].
For example, the requirement that the operations of both the acquiring and acquired corporation be "in commerce" might in some cases preclude the Justice Department from acting to prevent an acquisition where one of the firms only affects commerce, regardless of the
probable anticompetitive effects in the "section of the country" involved. Antitrust Procedural Act of 1979, Hearings on S. 390 Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 242 (1979).
19. Hearings on H.R. 4049, supra note 18, at 26.
20. Id. at 30. It has been estimated that approximately 40 percent of all businesses in
the service sector are organized in noncorporate form. Id.
21. Hearings on H.R. 4049, supra note 18, at 195 (letter from Asst. Atty. Gen. John
Shenefield to Chairman Peter W. Rodino).
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accounting industry. Despite this potential result, the activity
could not be challenged in its incipiency because of the narrow
jurisdictional scope of section 7 of the Clayton Act. The Justice
Department was forced to wait until the activity ripened into a
22
Sherman Act violation before attacking it.
The Improvements Act amendment brings within the coverage
of section 7 acquisitions involving natural persons, partnerships,
associations, and other unincorporated entities. The amendment is
expected to most significantly affect partnerships, whereas natural
persons will rarely be involved in acquisitions having the prohibited anticompetitive effects.2" This amendment to the jurisdictional requirements of section 7 of the Clayton Act from "corporations" to "persons" responds to criticism that the legality of a
merger should not be founded upon the legal form chosen by the
entities involved, but instead upon its substantive effect on competition.2 4 The amendment strengthens the primary objective of section 7 of the Clayton Act by clearly indicating that natural persons, and noncorporate and corporate business entities are within
the jurisdictional scope of section 7.
Defining "in commerce" Under Section 7
Although Congress intended the Clayton Act to supplement the
existing laws against restraints of trade and monopolies,23 the
jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act was expressly more expansive than the Clayton Act.26 Until as recently as 1975,2' however,
the "in commerce" requirement of section 7 was interpreted as im22. See notes 35-40 infra and accompanying text.
23. H.R. REP. No. 871, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1980) (letter from Asst. Atty. Gen.
Shenefield regarding H.R. 4049).
24. Hearings on the H.R. 4049, supra note 18, at 26.
25. Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "every contract, combination ....
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce .... " Section 2 provides: "Every person who
shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce.
... 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976).
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, prior to the Improvements Act, prohibited mergers between
"corporations engaged in commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
26. Clayton Act, Ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1976)). The Sherman Act applies to conduct that is actually anticompetitive in effect, but
not to that which is potentially anticompetitive. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S.
417, 444 (1920). The Clayton Act corrects the limited reach of the antitrust laws by prohibiting acquisitions, "the effect of [which] may be substantially to lessen competition, or to
tend to create a monopoly." 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976). Hence, a purpose of the Clayton Act is to
"nip monopoly in the bud." Transamerica Corp. v. Bd. of Governors, 206 F.2d 163, 169 (3d
Cir. 1953).
27. See United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271 (1975).
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plicitly coextensive with that of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act.2 8 The rationale for this conclusion was that the language used
to define "commerce" in the Clayton Act 2 ' substantially resembles
that of the Sherman Act 0 and the Commerce Clause.3 1 This parallel wording indicated Congressional intent when it enacted the
Clayton Act to exercise its full commerce power under the constitution. 2 Thus, regulation by the federal government of essentially

local activities which substantially affected interstate commerce
could be reached under the Clayton Act as it has under the Sherman Act and the Commerce Clause. 3
1.

Narrowed Judicial Interpretation: The ABMI Case

In 1975, the United States Supreme Court examined the express
provisions of section 7 and narrowly construed the jurisdictional
scope of section 7 of the Clayton Act in United States v. American
3 The government alleged
Building Maintenance Industries.
that
American Building Maintenance Industries (ABMI) had violated
section 7 of the Clayton Act by acquiring the stock of both J. E.
Benton Management Corporation and Benton Maintenance, and
by merging the latter into one of ABMI's wholly-owned subsidiaries. s 5 The district court granted ABMI's motion for summary judgment, holding that there had been no violation of section 7 of the
Clayton Act. 6 The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment.3 7 The

28. Clayton Act Amendment: Hearings on H.R. 6001 Before the Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law, House Committee on the Judiciary,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 34
(1977).
It is well settled that the "commerce" requirement of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act is
satisfied by activities that are either "in commerce" or "affect commerce." See Burke v.
Ford, 389 U.S. 320, 321 (1967); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar
Co., 334 U.S. 219, 232 (1948).
29. The Clayton Act refers to "trade or commerce among the several states and with
foreign nations." 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1976).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
32. "Since the general language of the Sherman Act was designed by Congress 'to go to
the utmost extent of its Constitutional power in restraining trust and monopoly agreements'
the supplementary general language of the Clayton Act was undoubtedly intended to have
the same all inclusive scope." Transamerica Corp. v. Bd. of Governors, 206 F.2d 163, 166 (3d
Cir. 1953), quoting United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U.S. 533, 558
(1944).
33. See Note, The "In Commerce" Requirements of Clayton § 7, 51 NOTRE DA^E LAwvaR 522, 526 (1976).
34. 422 U.S. 271 (1975).
35. Id. at 273.
36. Id.
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Court found that the acquired companies were not "engaged in
commerce" because their activities were wholly intrastate. Section
7 of the Clayton Act, therefore, did not cover the disputed acquisitions and merger.38
Unquestionably, ABMI was actively engaged in interstate commerce. According to the facts of the case, ABMI was one of the
largest suppliers of janitorial services in the country and served
more than 500 communities in the United States and Canada. It
was also the single largest supplier of janitorial services in Southern California. 9 Both of the acquired companies also supplied
janitorial services in Southern California and together constituted
seven percent of the total janitorial sales in the area. Although the
acquired companies serviced customers engaged in interstate commerce, the district court concluded that at the time of the challenged acquisition and merger neither of the acquired companies
was "engaged in commerce" within the meaning of section 7 of the
Clayton Act. 0
The Supreme Court agreed, reasoning that the explicit language
of section 7 required that the acquiring corporation, as well as the
corporations whose stock or assets were acquired, be "engaged in
commerce." 41 The Court thus framed the issue as whether or not
the phrase "engaged in commerce" as used in section 7 of the Clayton Act encompassed corporations engaged in intrastate activities
that substantially affect interstate commerce. 42 In reaching its determination that the jurisdictional scope of section 7 of the Clayton Act was limited to activities conducted in the flow of interstate
commerce, the Court had two bases of support. First, the Court
relied upon judicial precedent. 43 Second, the Court found persuasive congressional recognition of the distinction between legislation
limited to activities "in commerce" and full assertion of Congress'
commerce power, covering all activities substantially affecting interstate commerce."
37. The Government appealed directly to the Supreme Court pursuant to § 2 of the
Expediting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1976). 422 U.S. at 273 n.1.
38. Id. at 285-86.
39. Id. at 274-75.
40. Id. at 275.
41. Id. at 275-76, quoting 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
42. Id. at 275.
43. See the discussion of Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186 (1974), and
FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349 (1941), in United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance
Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 276-79 (1975).
44. See United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 279-82
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The Court in ABMI relied upon its past interpretation of the
jurisdictional scope of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, before amended, to determine the jurisdiction of section 7 of
the Clayton Act.4" The Court had held that the FTC's section 5
jurisdiction was limited to unfair methods of competition occurring
in the flow of interstate commerce. The Court therein had emphatically rejected the contention, identical to the one made in ABMI,
that "in commerce" should be read as if it meant "affecting inter47
state commerce.
The ABMI Court found this interpretation of FTC Act jurisdiction particularly relevant to its construction of the "in commerce"
language of section 7 of the Clayton Act. Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act were both
amended during the same congressional session and were designed
to deal with closely related aspects of the same problem-ensuring
free and fair competition nationwide. 4 The Court in ABMI rejected the argument that the "in commerce" language of section 7
should be construed as -coextensive with the Sherman Act, and
therefore more expansively than the Court's interpretation of the
FTC Act. 9
The second foundation for the Court's decision in ABMI was
congressional recognition of the distinction between legislation limited to activities "in commerce" and legislation encompassing all
activities substantially "affecting commerce." Although the Clayton Act was designed to supplement the Sherman Act, Congress
failed to reflect its intention to give the Clayton Act similarly expansive jurisdiction. The contrast between the explicit statutory

(1975), for discussion of the National Labor Relations Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act.
45. Ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976)).
46. See FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349 (1941). See also Note, Antitrust- United
States v. American Building Maintenance Industries: A Narrow Construction of Section 7
of the Clayton Act, 54 N.C. L. REv. 189, 191 (1976), where the author asserts that FTC v.
Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349 (1941), provides less support for ABMI than that suggested by
the Court.
47. The construction of § 5 urged by the Commission would thus give a federal
agency pervasive control over myriads of local businesses in matters heretofore
traditionally left to local custom or local law .... An inroad upon local conditions
and local standards of such far-reaching import as is involved here, ought to await
a clearer mandate from Congress.
FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349, 354-55 (1941).
48. United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 278 (1975).
49. The FTC Act subsequently was amended in 1975 to be coextensive with the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976).
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language of section 1 of the Sherman Act and sections 2(a) and 7
of the Clayton Act indicated that the jurisdiction of the Clayton

Act was limited by its explicit language and had to be construed
narrowly. 0 The Court seized upon the fact that the statutory language concerning jurisdiction was different in the two acts. 1 Because the Sherman Act had a broader reach than the Clayton Act,
the Court found that jurisdiction of the acts was not coextensive.
Furthermore, in amending and reenacting section 7 of the Clayton
Act in 1950, Congress retained the narrow "in commerce" language, rather than adopting the broad "affecting commerce" jurisdictional formulation.5 2 The preservation of the requirement that
both the acquiring and acquired companies be "engaged in commerce" demonstrated congressional intent, at the time of amendment, not to extend the drastic prohibitions of section 7 of the
Clayton Act to the full reach of the commerce power.5 3

2.

Impact of ABMI and Statutory Amendment

The result of ABMI was that a national firm, engaged in interstate commerce, could acquire any number of local firms and create a monopoly notwithstanding that each acquisition violated the

50. United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 278 (1975).
51. Id. In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., Inc., 419 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1975), relied
upon in ABMI, the Court held:
[This] "in commerce" language . . . of § 1 of the Sherman Act . . . includes
within its scope all prohibited conduct "in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations .. " The jurisdictional reach of § 1
thus is keyed directly to effects on interstate markets and the interstate flow of
goods.
In contrast to § 1, the distinct "in commerce" language of the Clayton and
Robinson-Patman Act provisions. .. appears to denote only persons or activities
within the flow of interstate commerce-the practical, economic continuity in the
generation of goods and services for interstate markets and their transport and
distribution to the consumer. If this is so, the jurisdictional requirements of these
provisions cannot be satisifed merely by showing that allegedly anticompetitive
acquisitions and activities affect commerce.
Despite the finding that the facially narrow "in commerce" language limited the Clayton
Act provisions, the Copp Paving Court recognized the validity of an argument that the history and practical purposes of the Clayton Act required a more expansive jurisdictional
scope. Id. at 201. Whether or not such an argument would justify radically expanding the
jurisdiction expressed by the statutory language by judicial decision rather than by amendatory legislation was deemed doubtful. Id. at 202.
52. Id. at 280. A serious challenge to this conclusion is raised by the writer in Note,
Antitrust- United States v. American Building Maintenance Industries: A Narrow Construction of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 54 N.C. L. Rzv. 189, 191 (1976).
53. 422 U.S. at 281.
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substantive standard of section 7."1 A merger would not fall within
the prohibitions of section 7 of the Clayton Act if the acquired firm
was not directly engaged in the production, distribution, or acquisition of goods or services in interstate commerce, even though the
acquired firm's activity could significantly affect interstate
55

commerce.

Congressional discontent with judicial interpretation requiring
that both the acquiring and acquired firms be "in commerce" was
the major impetus for amending this aspect of section 7. The Improvements Act amends section 7 of the Clayton Act to reach activities of business entities that "engage in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce." 6 The amendment of section 7 provides
the necessary explicit congressional mandate that the jurisdiction
of section 7 is to be coextensive with the Sherman Act and extend
to the full reach of Congress' authority under the Commerce
Clause.5 7 Thus, the narrow judicial interpretation imposed on section 7 by ABMI is effectively "overruled" by enactment of the Im8
5
provements Act.

An additional effect of amending the jurisdictional language of
section 7 is that it provides for simplification and efficiency of enforcement of section 7 cases. Testimony at the congressional hearings on the amendment indicated that judicial resources were often
consumed over the question of whether the acquired or acquiring
corporation was "in commerce" or "affects commerce."' The
See H.R. REP. No. 871, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1980).
The following is an example of the type of activity which is encouraged by ABMI:
Assume A is a firm located in Kansas City, Kansas, and has a substantial portion
of the building maintenance business in that market, but does no business outside
the State. Further assume that B is a national business maintenance business corporation based in Kansas City, Missouri. Company B makes what would be an
unlawful acquisition of Company A under the substantive standard of § 7. While
Company A engages in commercial activities which substantially "affect" interstate commerce, it is not "in" interstate commerce. [Applying the result of the
decision in ABMI] the Justice Department or a private party (including the illegally acquired business) cannot challenge B's acquisition of A under § 7 of the
Clayton Act, even though the effect of the acquisition may be substantially to
lessen competition in the Kansas City, Kansas market.
H.R. REP. No. 871, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1980).
56. Act of September 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-349, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 1157.
57. See H.R. REP. No. 871, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980).
58. Id. at 1.
59. Hearings on H.R. 4049, supra note 18, at 169. David L. Foster, a member of the
American Bar Association Antitrust Section Counsel, observed: "[S]ome Section 7 actions
have been impeded by the necessity of taking evidence on the volume of incidental interstate purchases or telephone calls in order to determine whether a company was engaged in
54.
55.
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amendment simplifies section 7 litigation by substantially reducing
the likelihood of a need for a determination on the issue of
whether each party is engaged "in commerce."
PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF AMENDMENT OF SECTION 7: CORRECTION OF
JURISDICTION ANOMALIES

Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act
The Sherman Act proscribes the illegal conduct of "persons" and

encompasses "trade or commerce among the several states and
with foreign nations."60 The term "persons" includes natural persons, corporations, unincorporated associations, partnerships, and
other unincorporated business entities.6" When the Sherman Act
was enacted in 1890, Congress took a very narrow view of its power
under the Commerce Clause.62 The Supreme Court has since permitted the reach of the Sherman Act to expand along with the expanding notions of Congress' commerce power." Presently, the Supreme Court broadly construes the Sherman Act to proscribe
"every contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States. . ., whether entered into by a
natural person, partnership, corporation or other form of business
organization."'"
Section 7 of the Clayton Act was intended to supplement the

Sherman Act by reaching incipient monopolies and restraints of
trade.6 5 The Improvements Act removes the anomaly that a statute
intended to prohibit incipient monopolies had less jurisdictional

breadth than the statute designed to prohibit unlawful use of moncommerce. These jurisdictional nuances are, of course, largely irrelevant to antitrust objectives." Id. at 169.
60. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976).
61. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
62. See H.R. REP. No. 1707, 51st Cong., 1st Seas. 1 (1890).
63. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 201-02 (1974). Compare United
States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) with Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American
Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948) and United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n.,
347 U.S. 186 (1954).
64. United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 279 (1975) (emphasis in original). See also Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743
n.2 (1976); McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 241 (1980).
65. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours Co., 353 U.S. 586, 589 (1957). See also
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485 (1977); FTC v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577-78 (1967); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270,
277 (1966); United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 170-71 (1964); United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362-63 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 317-18 (1962).
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opoly power. 60 In addition, the term "person" is given the meaning

accorded to it under section 1 of the Sherman Act.6 7 Because the
jurisdictional scope of section 7 is now clearly coextensive with the

Sherman Act, jurisdictional standards and precedent applicable to
Sherman Act cases may be useful in determining the jurisdictional
requirements of a section 7 Clayton Act case.
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
Section 7 of the Clayton Act authorizes the FTC, the Department of Justice, and private parties to challenge mergers." The
FTC in addition has authority to challenge mergers under section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.6 Section 5 prohibits "unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce. 70 The FTC,
pursuant to section 5, has the authority to challenge alleged anticompetitive acquisitions or other similar transactions involving
noncorporate and corporate entities.71 Although the ability to challenge such activity under section 7 was restrained by the ABMI
decision, the FTC could still pursue activity which substantially

violated section 7 under section 5 of the FTC Act. 7 ' Thus, the FTC
apparently had greater authority to challenge merger activity than
the Department of Justice or private parties. 8
66. See H.R. RaP. No. 871, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1980).
67. Id. at 7.
68. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976). Although § 7 of the Clayton Act is most commonly employed
to challenge a merger, action may be taken under three other statutory provisions. An acquisition of a noncorporate entity, previously not subject to challenge under § 7, may be
attacked under § 5 of the FTC Act as an unfair method of competition. Section 1 of the
Sherman Act also provides an alternative to challenge the acquisition of a noncorporate
enterprise. Finally, a merger violates § 2 of the Sherman Act, if the merger creates a potential monopoly or is an attempt to monopolize within the market.
While these provisions enable various methods to challenge an anticompetitive merger or
acquisition, there are shortcomings. For example, § 7 only requires proof that the merger
may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. On the other hand, § 1
of the Sherman Act requires a showing of an actual substantial lessening of competition.
Given this additional burden, an attack under § 7 of the Clayton Act is clearly preferable.
See KrrtNR, supra note 8, at 99-100.
69. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
70. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976).
71. The statute pertains to "[a]ny such person, partnership, or corporation." 15 U.S.C. §
45(b) (1976). See Foremost Dairies, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 944 (1962); Beatrice Foods Co., 67 F.T.C.
473 (1965).
72. An antitrust scholar has noted that "acts or practices which are for technical reasons
beyond the scope of [the Clayton Act] . . . may be reached by the Commission under Section 5 if they have or are likely to have a substantial anticompetitive effect." KrrNzR, supra
note 8, at 23.
73. H.R. REP. No. 871, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1980).
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Coextensive authority for enforcing merger law was needed for
several reasons.7 4 The Justice Department and the FTC work together to coordinate their enforcement activities and to avoid du76
plication of effort.75 One agency, possessing a certain expertise,
might be more effective in challenging particular mergers than the

other." The Justice Department might have more knowledge and
experience regarding specific industries and firms, thus making it
the more appropriate investigatory agency.78 Further, a merger

74.

In the field of enforcement of merger law, where investigations and enforcement
decisions must be completed very quickly, proposed mergers must be assigned to
one agency or the other in the very early stages of investigation. At this stage, it is
difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether the firms involved are "engaged
in" interstate commerce, or merely "affect" interstate commerce. If, following a
decision for [Department of Justice] Antitrust Division investigation, the Division
determined after further investigation that a firm merely "affected" commerce,
and that only the FTC could prevent the merger, reassignment of that transaction
to the FTC would be a waste of time and effort not only for the government enforcement agencies, but also for the affected private parties as well.
Hearings on H.R. 4049, supra note 18, at 45.
75. Hearings on H.R. 4049, supra note 18, at 45. The two agencies have established a
systematic, mutual exchange of information regarding investigations. When one agency begins an investigation, the other agency is promptly notified. If any objections arise as to the
action proposed by either agency, the question of which agency should proceed is submitted
to a joint conference. Aside from this procedure, an enforcement prograln has emerged from
case-by-case action, in which "the two agencies have attempted, with limited, but ever increasing, success to cooperate in their dual administration of the antitrust law." ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ANTIThUs' LAws, REPORT, at 376 (1976). See
also KITNER, supra note 8, at 148-49.
76. Congress has recognized that the decision to challenge acquisitions in a particular
industry should be based on the expertise of the separate agencies, "rather than on accidental jurisdictional differences." Hearings on H.R. 4049, supra note 18, at 169.
77. Federal Trade Commission litigation emphasizes activities which result in "unfair
methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" with an ultimate view
toward competition and consumer protection. S. KANWIT, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: RwiULATORY MANUAL SERnsS 1-2 (1979). The Justice Department considers that "the primary
role of Section 7 enforcement is to preserve and promote market structures conducive to
competition. The merger guidelines [a statement of policy of the Justice Department with
regard to enforcement of section 7 of the Clayton Act] focus primarily on the structure of
the market, and are intended to identify those mergers that alter market structure in ways
likely now or eventually to encourage or permit noncompetitive conduct." 1 B. Fox & E.
Fox, CORPORATE AcQuisrriONS AND MERGERS, § 22.02 (1976).
78. Hearings on H.R. 4049, supra note 18, at 45.
Traditionally the Justice Department has investigated the following industries: aluminum;
automobile industry monopolization and dealer relations; aviation; banking and securities;
communications; computers; international agreements; newspaper acquisitions; and tire
manufacturing.
The FTC has investigated: autoparts monopolization and acquisition; batteries and accessories distribution; cement; brewing monopolization and price discrimination; copiers and
business machines; dairy industry acquisitions; department store acquisitions; food and food
distribution; franchising; health care; petroleum monopolization; shopping center trade re-
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might be related to ongoing investigations, litigation, or enforce79
ment activities being conducted by a particular agency.
Congress determined that denying equal jurisdictional authority

to the Justice Department might lead to less effective, and possibly
inconsistent, antitrust enforcement.8 0 The Improvements Act
removes jurisdictional inconsistencies in merger law and mandates
that section 7 of the Clayton Act is to be coextensive With section 5

of the FTC Act. The jurisdictional standards applicable to section
5 of the FTC Act now also apply to section 7 of the Clayton Act,
thus placing the Justice Department's and private parties' mergerchallenging ability on an equal basis with that of the FTC.8'1
Section 7A of the Clayton Act
To facilitate the investigation of imminent mergers by the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department and the FTC, Congress

added section 7A to the Clayton Act by enactment of the HartScott-Rodino-Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976. 8" This legislation established pre-merger notification and waiting requirements
for persons planning to consummate very large mergers and acqui-

sitions.' The advance notice given the FTC and the Justice Destraints; textile mill products acquisitions; and tires. See generally Sloan, Antitrust: Shared
Information Between the FTC and the Department of Justice, 1979 BRIGHAM YOUNG U. L
RRv. 883, 886 citing Roll, Dual Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws by the Department of
Justice and the FTC: The Liaison Procedure, 31 Bus. LAw. 2075-76 (1976).
79. Hearings on H.R. 4049, supra note 18, at 45.
80. H.R. REP.No. 871, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1980).
81. Id. at 2.
82. Pub. L. 94-435, Title II, § 201, 90 Stat. 1390, (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18A (1976)).
83. "[N]o person shall acquire, directly or indirectly, any voting securities or assets of
any other person, unless both persons... file notification. . . [and] if. . .the acquiring
person, or the person whose voting securities or assets are being acquired, is engaged in
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 18A(a) (1976).
The required waiting period shall:
(A) begin on the date of the receipt by the Federal Trade Commission and the
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division of the Department
of Justice (hereinafter referred to in this section as the "Assistant Attorney General") of(i) the completed notification required under subsection (a), or
(ii) if such notification is not completed, the notification to the extent completed and a statement of the reasons for such noncompliance,
from both persons, or, in the case of a tender offer, the acquiring person; and
(B) end on the thirtieth day after the date of such receipt (or in the case of a cash
tender offer, the fifteenth day), or on such later date as may be set under subsection (e)(2) or (g)(2).
15 U.S.C. § 18a(b)(1) (1976).
Section 7A only applies to activity that meets, or is above, the base monetary require-
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partment s4 to investigate substantial mergers and acquisitions
strengthens the enforcement of section 7 of the Clayton Act.8 5
Prior to the passage of the Improvements Act, however, enhanced enforcement of section 7 through the use of section 7A was
impeded. Under section 7A, prior notification to the government is
required of significant acquisitions by or from any "person" if either party is "engaged in commerce or any activity affecting commerce." 6 The Justice Department,8 7 however, could not challenge
such acquisitions unless the "in commerce" test of section 7 was
met.8 8 To require that the Justice Department be given notice to
evaluate merger information, but not allow it to challenge the activity underlying such information, was illogical. The Improvements Act empowers both the Justice Department and the FTC to
oppose pre-merger transactions that will affect commerce. Section

ments of § 7A. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a)(2)-(3) (1976). Private parties are not entitled to this advance notice. Any information or documentary material filed with the Justice Department
or the FTC pursuant to section 7A "shall be exempt from disclosure. . . and no such information or documentary material may be made public, except as may be relevant to any
administrative or judicial action or proceeding." 15 U.S.C. § 18a(h) (1976).
84. Both the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department and the FTC have the authority to halt impending mergers before consummation by seeking temporary restraining
orders and preliminary injunctions from the federal courts.
15 U.S.C. §§ 25, 53(b) (1976). In addition to the enforcement of the antitrust laws by the
Justice Department and the FTC, private parties may also bring antimerger actions. Private
litigants may sue for treble damages for actual injury suffered as a result of an antitrust
violation, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976), and can seek injunctive relief against threatened loss or
damage by a violation of the antitrust laws. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976). Pre-merger injunctions
are often the only effective remedy against illegal mergers because it prevents possibly irreversible conglomeration of firms and irremediable anticompetitive effects. H.R. REP. No.
1373, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 2637.
The government carries the burden of proof in pre-merger injunction proceedings and
must demonstrate a reasonable probability that it will prevail on the merits of the merger
challenge. United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 297 F. Supp. 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1969);
United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F. Supp. 530 (W.D. Pa. 1963), affd, 320 F.2d 509
(3d Cir. 1963). Crucial to a pre-merger challenge is advance notice of an imminent merger,
data relevant to its legality, and at least several weeks to prepare a case. Without this information and preparation, the government would have no chance to sustain its burden of
proof and obtain a preliminary injunction against a merger that appeared to violate section
7 of the Clayton Act. H.R. REP. No. 1373, 94th Cong., 2d Seas. 8, reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG.

85.

& An. Naws 2637, 2640.

Section 7A also shifts the emphasis away from the traditional post-acquisition litiga-

tion in the merger area. S. KANwrr,

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: REGULATORY MANUAL SE-

RIES 17-45 (1979).
86. 15 U.S.C. § 18A (1976).
87. The FTC should also have been limited by the "in commerce" requirement, but was
able to circumvent this limitation by employing section 5 of the FTC Act. See supra note
72, and accompanying text.
88. H.R. REP. No. 871, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1980).

1981]

1980 Procedural Improvements Act

7A may now be used in conjunction with section 7 to effectively
challenge mergers and acquisitions in the pre-merger stage.8 9
RAMIFICATIONS OF LEGISLATIVE ACTION

The enactment of the Improvements Act is not so much a congressional innovation in antitrust law, as merely a continuing expansion of the jurisdictional reach of the antitrust laws. The passage of the 1980 Improvements Act mirrors the legislative actions
and purposes present in the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal
Trade Commission Improvement Act.90 The Magnuson-Moss Act
formally expanded FTC jurisdiction, pursuant to section 5 of the
FTC Act, to include activities "in or affecting commerce."' 1 An object of the FTC Improvement Act was to expand the FTC's ability

89. "Plainly, Congress wanted the Justice Department to have notice so that it could act
with respect to any such acquisition or merger that posed a competitive threat." Hearings
on H.R. 4049, supra note 18, at 169-70.
90. Pub. L. 93-637, Title II, § 201(a), 88 Stat. 2193 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45
(1976)). Subsequent to Bunte Bros. the "in commerce" language of section 5 had been liberally interpreted to effectuate the broad remedial purposes of the FTC Act. In FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 696 (1948), the Court stated: "The Commission would be rendered
helpless to stop unfair methods of competition in the form of interstate combinations and
conspiracies if its jurisdiction could be defeated on a mere showing that each conspirator
had carefully confined his illegal activities within the borders of a single state."
The FTC's own decisions, see Foremost Dairies Inc., 60 F.T.C. 944 (1962), and Beatrice
Foods Co., 67 F.T.C. 473 (1965), also allowed challenge to anticompetitive acquisitions and
mergers involving natural persons or corporate or noncorporate entities pursuant to § 5 of
the FTC Act, even though such transactions were not subject to § 7 of the Clayton Act
because of technical jurisdictional reasons. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
Despite this trend to diminish the impact of Bunte Bros., Congress recognized that the
decision placed considerable limitations on the ability of the FTC to achieve its purpose of
adequately protecting the interests of competitors and consumers in the modern American
economy. H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 7702, 7713. Consequently, Congress decided to amend the FTC Act by passing the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act:
The existing jurisdiction of the FTC under § 5 of the FTC Act is much narrower
than the scope of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. Consequently, many
unfair or deceptive acts or practices which affect commerce are now either beyond
the reach of the Commission or require an inordinate expenditure of time and
effort to marshal evidence to satisfy purely jurisdictional technicalities. Id....
The simplist and most sensible solution to this problem is to amend the FTC Act
to grant the Commission jurisdiction over matters "affecting" interstate commerce. This will reflect both the structure of the modern American economy and
the current Constitutional concept of the scope of the Federal government's authority to regulate the economy.
Id. at 7726.
91. Similar to § 7 of the Clayton Act, § 5 of the FTC Act formerly only reached activities
"in commerce." FTC Act, ch. 311 § 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 45
(1976)).
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to police the market effectively, by enabling it to regulate conduct
which, although local in character,affected interstate commerce.92
Similarly, the Improvements Act provides the "clear mandate"" to
support expansion of the jurisdictional scope of section 7 of the

Clayton Act.
Conceivably, the Improvements Act could be subject to constitu-

•tional attack, on the ground that, by extending the statute's scope,
Congress has improperly attempted to regulate local activities."
Given the general acceptance of legislative activity in expanding
the jurisdictional requirements of the antitrust laws, however, the

success of a constitutional challenge to the Act seems remote. The
Supreme Court in ABMP' did not suggest that Congress lacked
the requisite constitutional power to regulate local mergers and acquisitions that affect interstate commerce. Rather, the opinion

stated that the language of section 7 indicated that Congress did
not exercise its full constitutional power in enacting the statute."
The Court's determination in ABMI of the jurisdictional scope

of section 7 of the Clayton Act was founded upon statutory construction, not upon any constitutional limitations. Confining itself

to an examination of the supposed "plain meaning" of the words of
section 7 in the context of its legislative history,' the Court did
not address constitutional arguments."e Moreover, the Court recognized that the jurisdictional scope of the Sherman Act, in which
Congress exercised its full constitutional power under the Commerce Clause, may constitutionally reach local conduct which af-

92. H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Ses. reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 7702, 7726.
The Magnuson-Moss Act granted the FTC authority to regulate "transactions which
neither cross state lines nor constitute a part of a pattern of interstate commerce conducted
by the business concern itself or its local agents." Id.
93. In ABMI, the Court recognized that Congress had acted to remedy the narrow jurisdictional interpretation of § 5 of the FTC Act rendered by Bunte Bros. "Congress recently
acted to provide such a 'clearer mandate' amending the FTC Act by replacing the phrase 'in
commerce' with 'in or affecting commerce' in §§ 5, 6 and 12 of the Act." United States v.
American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 277 n.6 (1975).
94. "The justification for an expansive interpretation of the 'in commerce' language, if
such an interpretationis viable at all, must rest on a congressional intent that the Acts
reach all practices, even those of local character, harmful to the national marketplace." Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 198-99 (1974) (emphasis added).
95. United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 217 (1975).
96. Id. at 284 n.10.
97. In the legislative hearings, Eleanor Fox, a leading authority on antitrust law, emphasized that the Court's reasoning in ABMI was founded on a "technical exercise in statutory
construction." Hearings on H.R. 4049, supra note 18, at 112.
98. 422 U.S. at 279-81.
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fects interstate commerce. 99
In clarifying the language of section 7 to remedy the strict statutory construction applied by the Court in ABMI, Congress examined the policy considerations of expanding the jurisdiction of
the Clayton Act. Congress determined that section 7 should reach
firms affecting commerce and should apply to natural persons and
unincorporated entities. Acquisitions by persons and entities affecting, although not engaged in commerce, may be anticompetitive, 10 0 and thus should be subject to section 7's prohibitions, even
though such activities might be local in character. Thus, in view of
the judicial experience with the Sherman Act, expansion of the
jurisdictional scope of section 7 of the Clayton Act to allow it to
reach local activity which affects interstate commerce will probably
withstand constitutional challenge.

99. Id. at 278. In a recent decision, McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444
U.S. 232 (1980), the Court recognized the breadth of Sherman Act prohibitions, but took a
more restrictive approach toward satisfaction of the jurisdictional requirements before the
statute could be invoked. In McLain, a private antitrust action was brought against real
estate firms and trade associations and a class of real estate brokers who had transacted
business in New Orleans. It was alleged that defendants had engaged in a price-fixing conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act. While readily accepting that the jurisdictional requirement of the Sherman Act may be satisfied under either the "in commerce" or the "effect on commerce" theory, the Court required a more stringent standard for establishment
of the effect on interstate commerce. The Court stated:
[Jiurisdiction may not be invoked under that statute unless the relevant aspect of
interstate commerce is identified; it is not sufficient merely to reply on identification of a relevant local activity and to presume an interrelationship with some
unspecified aspect of interstate commerce. To establish jurisdiction a plaintiff
must allege the critical relationship in the pleadings and if these allegations are
controverted must proceed to demonstrate by submission of evidence beyond the
pleadings either that the defendants' activity is itself in interstate commerce or, if
it is local in nature, that it has an effect on some other appreciable activity demonstrably in interstate commerce.
444 U.S. at 242, citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 202 (1974).
McLain, decided prior to enactment of the Improvements Act, was acknowledged in the
legislative history of the Improvements Act. See H.R. REP. No. 871, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1980).
Earlier the Court, in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186 (1974), likewise
expressed the restrictive viewpoint that is demonstrated in McLain.
This justification, [for an expansive interpretation of the "in commerce" language]
however, would require the courts to look to the practical consequences, not to
the apparentand nominal connections between commerce and activities that may
have no significant economic effect on interstate markets. (emphasis added).
Id. at 198-99.
100. See the discussion of "person" supra notes 13-23, and accompanying text, and see
the discussion of "affecting commerce" supra notes 25-33, and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

The Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of 1980 broadly
amends federal antitrust law. With respect to antitrust merger
jurisdiction, the Improvements Act amends section 7 to include all
"persons" who are engaged "in commerce" or "affect commerce."
The amendments clarify the statutory language of section 7, remove jurisdictional anomalies in federal merger law, and provide
the courts with a definitive statement of congressional intent concerning the applicability of section 7 to anticompetitive mergers
and acquisitions. The practical effect of the amendments is to remove arbitrary restrictions on section 7 antimerger jurisdiction in
relationship to related provisions of the Sherman Act, Clayton Act,
and FTC Act. Further, the amendments enable both the Justice
Department and the FTC to enforce with equal power the substantive provisions of section 7 of the Clayton Act. Finally, by extending section 7 to non-corporate entities and broadening the
scope of activities subject to merger law, Congress has ensured that
conduct in violation of the substantive provisions of section 7 of
the Clayton Act, and not mere jurisdictional defects or technicalities, will be the focus of investigatory and enforcement efforts in
federal merger law.
BETH BEUCHER

